Has the judgment in Mazur created the litigation equivalent of the walking dead?

Chris Ratcliffe, Senior Lecturer at NLS https://www.ntu.ac.uk/staff-profiles/law/christopher-ratcliffe

The recent High Court judgment in Mazur & Stuart v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) has sent shockwaves through the heart of litigation practice, transforming the way litigation firms conduct their business overnight. After the judgment was handed down, firms across England and Wales, that conduct litigation on behalf of their clients, will have been holding emergency meetings and staff debriefs, whilst still reeling from the shock of the decision, in light of the necessity to reassess how they act for their clients to ensure that litigation is only conducted by those authorised to do so.

The conduct of litigation is one of six reserved legal activities (“RLAs”) in section 12 of the Legal Services Act 2007 (“the Act”). Section 18 provides that only individuals authorised by an approved regulator, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”), may carry on a RLA. Carrying out a RLA when an individual is not entitled to do so is a criminal offence punishable by a maximum of 2 years imprisonment or fine (or both). It is therefore essential, that those within the legal profession understand the reach of the Act and this is perhaps one of the reasons why knowledge of RLAs is required by aspiring solicitors under the Solicitors Qualifying Examination specifications.  

The SRA provides authorisation to qualified solicitors under rule 9.1 of their Authorisation of Individuals Regulations which state “if you are a solicitor with a current practising certificate … you are entitled to carry on all reserved legal activities except notarial activities.” 

The conduct of litigation is widely defined under Schedule 2 of the Act as,

i. The issuing of proceedings before any court in England and Wales,

ii. The commencement, prosecution and defence of such proceedings,

iii. The performance of any ancillary functions in relation to such proceedings.

For the legal profession, this judgment is the equivalent of waking up and discovering that the UK had voted for Brexit. It came out of the blue and trampled over a long held general belief that non-authorised individuals could conduct litigation, if they were supervised by authorised individuals and/or employed by SRA regulated bodies.

The Facts and Judgment

Ms Julia Mazur and Mr Jerome Stuart challenged the status of an employee at Goldsmith Bowers Solicitors (“GBS”), Mr Middleton, whom had signed the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim in a claim against them for recovery of unpaid legal fees incurred by Charles Russell Speechlys (“CRS”) on their behalf. They argued that Mr Middleton was not a qualified solicitor and therefore not authorised to conduct litigation against them.

CRS submitted that the provisions of the Act provided that Mr Middleton was entitled to conduct litigation, being an employee of GBS (an SRA regulated body). This position was supported by a letter from the SRA (December 2024) which stated “employees are permitted to undertake reserved legal activities.” The court rejected these submissions. Indeed, by the time of the hearing the SRA had distanced themselves from their stated position.

In his judgment, Mr Justice Sheldon, said that the SRA were right to U-turn. He ruled that “mere employment by a person who is authorised to conduct litigation is not sufficient for the employee to conduct litigation themselves … the person conducting litigation, even under supervision, must be authorised to do so.”

Following Mazur only qualified solicitors with a current practising certificate can conduct litigation, however, non-authorised individuals can support in the conduct of litigation. The Law Society have attempted to give some clarity (Practice Note, October 2025) that ‘supporting’ includes undertaking activities prior to proceedings being initiated along with some limited specific examples;

i. The giving of general legal advice,

ii. Drafting pleadings, particulars of claim, applications and correspondence,

iii. Proofing witnesses, and drafting and signing statements of truth on witness statements.

This limited guidance provides some assistance but whether something constitutes conducting litigation is fact sensitive. What is lacking is a definitive list of which activities constitute conducting litigation, and which do not. There is uncertainty set against hefty criminal sanctions.

Discussion

My interpretation of the Act has always been as per the Mazur judgment i.e., only authorised individuals can carry on RLAs, while acknowledging the vital role that non-authorised individuals have in supporting the conduct of litigation. In my opinion, Mazur reflects the correct interpretation of the Act.

In practice, I adopted a broad and cautious approach to what constituted the conduct of litigation, given the severity of the sanctions. As a litigation solicitor, director and Compliance Officer within a litigation firm, I was responsible for ensuring that both the firm and its employees complied fully with the rigorous regulatory framework. The firm’s practice model required that only authorised individuals conduct litigation, while non-authorised employees provided support under close supervision of authorised individuals. I maintained a cautious stance, treating all interactions with the court in whatever capacity, including correspondence, applications or advocacy, as conducting litigation and such were only approved or undertaken by myself, or other authorised individuals.

However, since the turn of this century, there has been the slow creep of reducing legal costs and the ever expanding application of fixed recoverable costs across litigation. One pivotal catalyst was the 2013 civil justice reforms on costs with the introduction of court costs management and reinforcing the principle of proportionality. This has put litigation firms under increasing pressure to adapt their working practices to balance the need to remain profitable whilst delivering competent representation for clients, whilst complying with a robust regulatory framework.

Before Mazur, some litigation firms relied upon large numbers of highly competent yet non-authorised employees to conduct litigation on behalf of a vast client base closely supervised by a much smaller number of authorised individuals. Non-authorised employees cost less to retain, demanding a lower salary, and don’t come with certain regulatory costs e.g., the practising certificate fee. This business model has allowed overheads to remain at a profitable level but this has now been forced to change following Mazur.

In-house legal teams also utilise non-authorised employees to conduct litigation, particularly local authorities, under the supervision of authorised individuals. This ruling, therefore, not only has an impact upon the operation of the private sector, but also the public sector.

Mazur is going to lead to an increase in operating costs with the involvement of authorised individuals in all aspects of conducting litigation and non-authorised individuals restricted to a supportive role. For the private sector, this will mean lower profit margins, perhaps even running at an unsustainable loss leading to collapse. In the public sector, higher operating costs for already stretched public services are likely to be passed to the public, in financial terms or in a reduction in services.

That said, Mazur does not mean the end of non-authorised staff being employed in the legal sector, but with roles being restricted to a supportive function, the demand within the legal sector of non-authorised staff is likely to decrease. With a reduction in demand comes less opportunities for aspiring lawyers to start their legal careers.

It is yet to be seen how Mazur will impact the legal market, however, it is unlikely to be positive if the status quo remains. The private sector must remain profitable to operate. With regulatory restrictions on passing increased operating costs to clients, the private sector may call for an overhaul of fixed recoverable costs to mitigate the impact on profitability, but this will be robustly resisted by the insurance industry, or there may be redundancies in litigation firms. Equally, market rate salaries for non-authorised employees may decline to counterbalance their reduced role.

We must remember that Mazur is a High Court judgment and is likely to be appealed. It has created a hurricane of uncertainty in the legal profession, and whilst, in my view, it is unlikely to be overturned, one would hope the higher courts take the responsibility of providing indisputable guidance. However, whilst law firms are not yet sheltered in the eye of the storm, this turbulent weather will take a long time to pass. Appeals take time.

Recently, the Legal Services Board, in response, have announced that Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives will be able to apply for litigation practice rights, with precise details to be revealed. Fellows only make up a small number of non-authorised individuals in the legal profession, so this is unlikely to have any substantial mitigating impact.

Mazur also has significant implications for the past when litigation costs come under the scrutiny of the court. Opponents are likely to challenge any costs where a non-authorised individual has conducted litigation. At the Claims Futures Conference in October 2025, DJ Lumb spoke about how he applied Mazur to a housing possession claim, reducing fees from £3,000 to under £500, where it was clear that the case had been conduced by a non-authorised employee. With this approach, many litigation firms could now be functionally insolvent, like the walking dead in the legal market.

Further Reading

Mazur & Stuart v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB)

Legal Services Act 2007Law Society ‘Practice Note: Mazur and the Conduct of Litigation’