The Climber on the Clapham Omnibus: Reasonableness, Negligence and High Risk Sport

Rev'd Prof Helen Hall, Nottingham Law School https://www.ntu.ac.uk/staff-profiles/law/helen-hall

Dramatic headlines last week reported that a climber was suing his belayer, after falling some distance down a 17 metre rockface, and suffering life-changing injuries. The belayer’s role is to control the rope from the ground, and to apply a brake to secure the climber if they lose their grip or need to take a rest. If for whatever reason the belayer does not do this when the climber lets go, their unlucky partner will plummet until they land at the foot of the crag. Consequently, the stakes are extremely high and everyone involved in the sport is aware of the dangers. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, accidents like this one do occur from time to time. In what circumstances, if any, should tort law provide a remedy?

The same overarching principles apply to rock-climbing as other sports. Once a duty of care is assumed, it will be breached if the claimant failed to take reasonable care. What is reasonable depends on the circumstances in the round, including the experience and skill level of the participants. Whether or not the rules and customs governing the activity were respected is likely to be an important consideration, but it is not always the determining factor. Simply demonstrating a breach of regulations or conventions is not enough to establish negligence.  

This means that decisions are apt to be extremely fact-sensitive, and precedent has to be applied in a nuanced manner. There is a real danger in comparing apples and oranges, and the situation here is very different from the context of most previously reported climbing cases from England and Wales. A lot of the previous litigation concerned individuals who injured themselves by jumping or falling from bouldering walls, and such claimants have generally had a frosty reception from judges. Where the inherent risks were either obvious or adequately explained, volenti non fit injuria applied. Bouldering involves climbs on relatively low walls, without ropes and relying on crash mats for protection. As most people learn from experimentation and natural consequences in toddlerhood, you can get hurt even in playgrounds with soft surfaces if you fling yourself about too recklessly, or have an unlucky landing.

Interestingly, in one of the rare instances of a reported case arising in relation to roped climbing, the belayer was not a defendant, despite having been negligent by objective standards. In Day v High Performance Sports a relatively experienced climber failed to tie herself properly to the rope at an indoor wall. Unfortunately, she only noticed when she was about nine metres off the ground, and fell whilst a rescue attempt was being made.   She sued the climbing centre, arguing that their response was inadequate, in particular since the employee monitoring for safety was not wearing a harness, and therefore could not ascend the wall quickly to intervene. The claim was unsuccessful, as whilst the safety measures in place were open to improvement, they were robust enough to satisfy the centre’s duty to their clients.

This ruling seems just, given that climbing centres cannot realistically monitor users at all times, and it is an express condition of entry that climbers must be either competent with the equipment, or appropriately supervised. In this instance, the claimant was in fact supervising the poor belayer, which almost certainly explains why no accusing finger was pointed in her direction. It is standard practice for climbing partners to check each other, and to ensure that their counterpart is properly attached. Obviously, this did not happen here, presumably because the belayer was relying on her friend to look after them both.  This raises an interesting question, as in many contexts, for example driving, tort law demands certain minimum standards even from people under instruction. Given that the belayer has literally life and death in their hands, anyone doing it alone needs to have a basic level of competency, even if they are a relative beginner.

Of course, in a motoring context, other road users have not consented to the risks posed by erratic learner drivers doing their best. In contrast, a climber like Day who knowingly lets their friend belay them, whilst entirely conscious that they lack the required knowledge and skills, is embracing jeopardy with their eyes open. The facts of Littlejohn v Williams are different again. It appears to have been that the climbers were not well known to one another, and Littlejohn expressly asserts that he trusted in William’s competence because he was a member of a club that required recommendations to join. It seems that neither of the pair knew all that much about the other’s aptitude and experience. To what extent did they both have a responsibility to ask questions or make disclosures before climbing together; had they done enough to gauge the ability and limitations of the person with whom they were working?

It is not yet clear what difference more information beforehand would have made, if any at all. At the time of writing, there are no details of the defence in the public domain. Even the claimant’s version of events leaves room for doubt as to whether: a) Williams made a mistake due to gross carelessness or inexperience; or b) Littlejohn and Williams were equal participants in a catastrophic failure of communication. There are various different types of climbing, and a number of techniques approaches within them. In this particular context, taking the climber off the belay at some point during the climb was always part of the plan, but only once they were securely attached to alternative protection.  

This matters because in many other climbing situations, the belayer is absolutely required to keep hold of the rope until the climber is safely back on terra firma, and it is inexcusably reckless not to do so. Sadly, there are instances of belayers failing these circumstances, and unless they had a seizure or otherwise acted involuntarily, there is nothing to argue about in terms of negligence. Their primary job was not to let go, and they let go. Despite some of the more lurid press reports implying otherwise, the details here are more complex.

Exactly why did Williams take Littlejohn off the belay? Did he just blithely assume that Littlejohn was safe, or did he have some reason to believe so? There was a busy road close by, and the weather conditions are not known. Did he misunderstand a shouted exchange, partly because of the wind or the roar of traffic? We do not know what conversation the two men had had beforehand, or what they had done on previous climbs, both of which will have influenced Williams’ thought process. We also do not know why Littlejohn apparently let go of the cliff without calling down to check that his partner had “got him”.

Clearly, unless Williams was actively trying to kill or injure Littlejohn, he made a mistake.   This error does not automatically amount to a breach of duty for the purposes of negligence however. For example, if he genuinely believed that Littlejohn had called down to him that he was secure, and only then did he take him off belay, his actions might have been reasonable, despite the horrific outcome. It may well be that with hindsight, both men could have done more to avoid a terrible misunderstanding. Accidents arising from miscommunication in noisy outdoor environments are arguably part and parcel of the risks assumed whilst engaging in such activities.

It remains to be seen how this case will play out, and even whether it will progress to trial.   Nevertheless, the very fact that the claim was brought raises questions about the operation of negligence in respect of high jeopardy leisure activities, where ordinary human fallibility can have dire consequences, and mistakes are always a possibility. Should individuals only engage in these pursuits if they are willing to take out special insurance, at least when not covered by a club or climbing centre policy? Or alternatively, should a defence of volenti apply in the absence of gross carelessness or deliberate wrongdoing?

Further Reading

Tim Hanlon and Carl Eve “Climber crippled in Avon Gorge fall blames climb partner and is suing him for £1,000,000”https://www.bristolpost.co.uk/news/bristol-news/climber-crippled-avon-gorge-fall-10215001 (26/5/2025)

Megan Griffiths, “Negligence and Sports Injuries: Some Common Threads” (23/3/2023) https://12kbw.co.uk/negligence-and-sports-injuries-common-threads/ 

Richard Rowe “Actionable or Acceptable: The Narrow Line Between Sport and Tort” (22/6/2022) https://www.dacbeachcroft.com/en/What-we-think/Actionable-or-acceptable-The-narrow-line-between-sport-and-Tort 

Case Law

Harrison v Intuitive Business Consultants Ltd (t/a Bear Grylls Survival Race) [2021] EWHC 2396 (QB)

Carter v Kingswood Learning and Leisure Group Ltd [2018] EWHC 1616 (QB)

Maylin v Dacorum Sports Trust (t/a XC Sportspace) 2017] EWHC 378 (QB)

Harrison v Jagged Globe (Alpine) Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 835

Pinchbeck v Craggy Island Ltd [2012] EWHC 2745 (QB)

MacIntyre v Ministry of Defence [2011] EWHC 1690 (QB)

Poppleton v Trustees of the Portsmouth Youth Activities Committee [2008] EWCA Civ 646

Affiong Amy Dahomi Day (By Her Father and Litigation Friend Terry Day) v High

Performance Sports Limited (Trading as Castle Climbing Centre [2003] EWHC 197 (QB)

Chalk v Ministry of Defence [2002] EWHC 422 (QB)