Irene Sacchetti, PhD candidate NLS https://www.ntu.ac.uk/study-and-courses/courses/our-students-stories/law/irene-sacchetti
Dave Hoefler
‘Australia and Tuvalu are a family’, were the words used by Anthony Albanese, prime Minister of Australia since 2022, after the signature of the Falepili Union Treaty with the prime Minister Natano from Tuvalu. Such family tie expression adopted by Albanese reflects the Falepili concept of the agreement. Falepili, according to Tuvaluans unique kinship values, means looking after your neighbours, as an act of giving without expecting anything in return.
According to Albanese, the Australia-Tuvalu treaty aims to safeguard the future of Tuvalu, the world's lowest-lying nation in the Pacific, under the existential threat of rising sea levels. It has been commended as a lifeline across the Pacific because the agreement opens a migration pathway for those affected by the disastrous impacts of climate change in Tuvalu with the possibility to ‘live, study and work in Australia’ (article 3). Optimistic views commend the Falepili Union as the first bilateral agreement on climate mobility, potentially spurring action to assist most affected communities by climate change.
At first glance, the agreement seems particularly timely in responding to the lack of an internationally accepted definition and adequate international legal protection for those forced to cross borders due to climate change impacts- the so-called 'climate refugees'- threatening the habitability of their homelands.
It appears sensitive to often neglected aspects of migration within the Pacific region, such as climate change implications explicitly recognised as a migration driver, recognition of voluntary non-migration, mobility with dignity, and a forward-looking approach. Furthermore, if Pacific inhabitants contribute the least to historic emissions but are at the frontline in experiencing the most disastrous consequences of climate change, with this agreement, it would be intriguing to understand whether Australia is willing to take responsibility for its past and present emissions and offering migration pathways to compensate for the blatant climate injustice that Pacific Islands, in this case, are facing.
However, as with every ground-breaking decision or agreement, there are always multiple factors to consider when assessing the leap forward that has been made. In this case, the adoption of words suggesting a strong and deep trustworthy kinship is striking, along with the expression ‘migrating with dignity’, which has been the cornerstone of migration policies to adapt to climate change by former President of Kiribati, Anote Tong, and which is discussed in the legal literature to advance human rights-based approaches to climate mobilities.
The adoption of the Tuvaluan expression falepili requires a deeper analysis, as the choice of language is not accidental but shaped according to the aim. Language can be either used as a site of struggle to convey messages of resistance and action or as a strategic tool to disguise forms of oppression and legitimise commodification or domination. This inevitably leads to questions about whether there are implications – and what those are - beyond the surface appearance of words adopted by the Australian prime Minister and in the treaty itself. Is the inclusion of Falepili concept in the Union treaty a genuine attempt of Australia to ‘look after’ the Pacific neighbour country without asking for anything in return? Does Australia want to contribute to climate justice by offering migration pathways to those forced to move because of climate change? Or is there a price that Tuvalu would need to pay in exchange for Australia’s assistance under climatic cooperation terms (article 2), and security and stability cooperation (article 4)?
Australian political rhetoric does not seem to match reality, nor does the Tuvaluan concept of Falepili, which appears to have been misunderstood, or rather abused, to disguise the colonial legacy behind the concession of migration pathway for the most affected by climate change towards Australian territory. In return for opening the possibility of migrating with dignity of Pacific populations to Australia, Tuvalu “shall mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defence-related matters” under article 4.4 of the Treaty. Or, to put it another way, in return for having effective veto power over Tuvalu’s key national and foreign security policies, including “defence, policing, border protection, cyber security and critical infrastructure, including ports, telecommunications and energy infrastructure” (article 4.4), Australia offers to 280 citizens of Tuvalu per year a special visa arrangement, a cap that is variable according to the frequency and severity of climate change impacts.
This epitomises the neocolonial and imperialist strategy of Australia to gain a geo-strategic position in the Pacific region to advance US interests and counter the Chinese presence in the region after the agreement with Salomon Islands to maintain internal security and help fight climate change. Arguably, the control over Tuvalu’s key policies contributes to eroding the sovereignty of the Pacific Island on national security issues, along with the agency of those directly affected by climate change and, as such, the protagonists of possible migration pathways. The price to pay in exchange involves a consistent intrusion of Australian power and fortified protection and control of borders under the security threat posed by climate change. Australia has instrumentalised climate-related migration pathways to give a false signal of addressing climate-related concerns while advancing geopolitical interests and reinforcing the idea of unbreakable border regimes. In other words, the Falepili agreement feeds into Global North approaches to cross-border migration that instrumentalises and commodifies refugees and migrants to obscure geopolitical interests far from climate justice-related intentions. The Pacific is one of the most emblematic examples where the figures of climate 'refugees' have been reduced to the narrative of 'victim-commodities' that legitimise Western laboratories for policy making, as in the case of the Falepili Union.
If climate change implications were an opportunity for Australia, as one of the highest emitting countries and biggest coal exporters in the world, to take responsibility for past and present climate-related injustices and inaction experienced mainly by neighbouring countries in the Pacific, and provide migration pathways with authentic efforts in that regard, colonial patterns masked under the name of security of the Pacific region infiltrated a pure and genuine idea of looking after the neighbour as family and contributed to reinforce depoliticisation and commodification of so-called climate 'refugees'.
Further Reading
Atapattu, S. (2022). Migrating with Dignity: Protecting the Rights of ‘Climate Refugees’ with non-refoulement Principle in Behrman, S., Kent, A. Climate Refugees: Global, Local and Critical Approaches (eds), pp. 127-145.
Australia- Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty, available at <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty>.
Baldwin, A. (2013). Racialisation and the Figure of the Climate-Change Migrant. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 45(6), 1474-1490.
Braddock, J. (2023). Australia strikes neo-colonial “security” pact with Tuvalu to counter China in Pacific, WSWS, available at < https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2023/11/13/vouf-n13.html>.
Farbotko, C. (2010). Wishful Sinking: Disappearing Islands, Climate Refugees and Cosmopolitan Experimentation. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 51 (1), pp. 47–60.
Kekera, G. (2022). We needed China deal to protect ‘domestic security’, says key Solomon Islands official, The Guardian, available at < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/14/we-needed-china-deal-to-protect-domestic-security-says-key-solomon-islands-official>.
Kitara, T., Farbokto, C. (2023). This is not Climate Justice: The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union, Toda Peace Institute, available at <https://toda.org/global-outlook/2023/this-is-not-climate-justice-the-australia-tuvalu-falepili-union.html>.
Lewis, L. (2023). Australia-Tuvalu treaty is 'to maintain our identity', Kausea Natano says, RNZ, available at <https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/502395/australia-tuvalu-treaty-is-to-maintain-our-identity-kausea-natano-says>.
McAdam, J. (2023). Australia’s Offer of Climate Migration to Tuvalu Residens is groundbreaking, The Conversation, available at <https://theconversation.com/australias-offer-of-climate-migration-to-tuvalu-residents-is-groundbreaking-and-could-be-a-lifeline-across-the-pacific-217514?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=bylinetwitterbutton>.
Morton, A. (2022). Australia’s new approach was a rare positive at Cop27 – but now the need for action is all the more acute, The Guardian, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/21/australia-cop27-climate-summit>.
Munoz, S.M. (2021). Environmental Mobility in a Polarized World: Questioning the Pertinence of the "Climate Refugee" Label for Pacific Islanders. J Int Migr Integr. 22(4), pp. 1271-1284.
Nhalevilo, A. (2011) Language is also a Place of Struggle, 6 Cultural Studies of Science and Education, pp. 441-444.
Natano. K. (2022). The Climate Crisis Is Making the Pacific Islands Uninhabitable. Who Will Help Preserve Our Nations?, The Time, available at <https://time.com/6217104/climate-crisis-pacific-islands-uninhabitable/>.
Salem, S. (2020). Climate Refugees in the Pacific. Environmental Law Reporter 50 (7), pp. 10540-10545.
Tong, A., Rimon, A. (2021). The seas are coming for us in Kiribati. Will Australia rehome us?, The Conversation, available at < https://theconversation.com/the-seas-are-coming-for-us-in-kiribati-will-australia-rehome-us-172137 >.
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